The Professional Ethics of Ostad Elahi

This lecture was presented in French at a symposium entitled " Spirituality: Plurality and Unity," and was subsequently published in "Les Cahiers d’Anthropologie Religieuse No. 5, Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, 1996" as part of the Acta of the symposium.

The Court of Appeals is truly an ideal forum to discuss the question of ethics and rights, for it highlights the importance of this subject in legal and social relations. Ostad Elahi, whose centennial we are commemorating this year, never separated his personal research in the field of ethics from his professional life as a judge, and considered the practice of ethics to be an extension of his profession. Today, I would like to introduce a few aspects of the philosophy of this distinguished jurist, who is still relatively unknown in the West.

As the honorable Chief Justice reminded us a few moments ago, the word "ethics" has various meanings. It is not necessary to review all of them, for what we are concerned with here is ethics in its most inclusive sense; in other words, norms of personal conduct based on pre-established and unchanging principles shared by humanity at large. Although everyone may not be in agreement with this definition, it at least helps us to clarify the subject of our talk. We shall examine two fundamental concepts in Ostad Elahi’s philosophy: the principle of respecting the rights of individuals (which, in a sense, is a direct consequence of distributive justice), and the principle of equity.

Ostad Elahi served on the judiciary from 1934 to 1957 in various provinces throughout Iran. Beginning his career as a government prosecutor, he would become a magistrate, a judge, and ultimately, the President of the Court of Appeals. Jurists, who are aware of the many differences between the bench and the prosecutor’s office, will appreciate Ostad Elahi’s complementary vision of these two arms of the law. He considered the judiciary as one of the most important elements in society, often saying that the profession of a judge and a physician is a sacred one.

Ostad believed that a simple reading of our statutes made it clear that applying laws could, in many ways, be more difficult than diagnosing an illness. Indeed, a judge frequently has to assess a particular situation, interpret the pertinent facts, and weigh the various interests involved (not only those of the litigants, but also those of the general public). As most statutes tend to be obscure or incomplete on their face, a mechanical application of the law is frequently impossible. Judges have the moral and professional imperative to issue rulings, a task which requires not only great precision, but also wisdom and diligence—a constant inner concern, if you will, for rendering fair and impartial justice. In this regard, Ostad used to say: "Like a jeweler who recognizes a piece of jewelry at first glance, after four or five years a judge instantly knows if an accused person is innocent or guilty. That is why wrong verdicts are quite rare." "Of course," he would add, "this is true only of those judges who are committed to being honest at all costs."

The training of a judge, then, is not merely confined to the study of jurisprudence. Above all, it is essential for judges to develop a sense of immanent justice, for it is this very quality that guides the rendering of just verdicts. As you can see, this is a high moral imperative indeed. Judges, who are dealing with intentions as well as behaviors, become capacitated to remedy the harmful effects of the law, which may become too rigid if not interpreted and applied with moderation. It is in such a context that one can appreciate how judicial practice can be a true field for experimentation, an invaluable means for acquiring values.

I would also like to say a few words about distributive justice and its corollaries in Ostad Elahi’s system of thought. You may be wondering if it is even possible to reconcile personal ethics, on the one hand, and jurisprudence, on the other. Indeed, this may sound somewhat idealistic, and certain schools have even tried to establish a total separation between the two. Yet, if we really think about it, doesn’t the law precisely seek to restore each person’s rightful due, thereby ensuring the prevalence of public order and social justice? In fact, isn’t the very definition of distributive justice to render every man his just due? The instauration of such justice, then, becomes the necessary outcome of respect for the rights of others. This, by the way, is one of the basic tenets of French law.

To achieve ideal justice, human beings must respect each and every right, which is why the foundations of distributive justice must be metaphysical. Here, we are dealing with the core of the issue. Indeed, every being, by virtue of his existence, is endowed with fundamental rights. This sphere of "intuitu personae" cannot be disregarded, for individual rights necessarily impact and interfere with the obligations of others. This is the basic pattern according to which the various rights of individuals can be articulated; it also accounts for the necessity of rules in order for rights to be effectively respected. Thus, rights and duties are inseparable: both are engaged in a dialectical relationship that originates from the same idea. Ostad Elahi is particularly original on this point, as he emphasizes the fact that all beings—including animals, plants, etc.—have rights that must be taken into account. This view should not be confused with utilitarian and specious trends in the theory of law, for Ostad clearly distinguishes between people and predetermined beings. Only humans are endowed with free will, which enables them to make reflected choices that may lead to mistakes. Free will, then, is an irreducible dimension. From this perspective, we can better understand the following maxim by Ostad: "The axis of life in this world rests on a single principle: respect for the rights of others." This principle underlies the ideal functioning of society, as well as the dimensions of a jurisprudence that is rooted in a genuine consideration for each person’s rights rather than an intuitive blend of good sentiments and intentions. Naturally, this notion of rights is inseparable from a precise assessment of each situation, and the concrete examples mentioned by Ostad show the complexity and extreme precision required to establish a set of given facts.

The second point I would like to discuss today is equity. It was Ostad Elahi’s intransigent quest for fairness and his outstanding integrity that earned him the respect of judges, lawyers, and interested parties. Here, I would like to salute François Ameli, a professor of law at la Sorbonne whose father had the opportunity as the Minister of Justice to meet with Ostad Elahi. I had a brief discussion with him before the symposium, in which he shared how this intransigence and ethical disposition were present even in Ostad’s daily life.

For Aristotle, equity arises from mediation between the abstract rigor of the law and the concrete case, and is always linked to the perilous practice of rendering a judgment, a practice that cannot rest solely on the rigidity of the written law. Rather, each particular situation must be examined and the stakes of each party carefully evaluated before any decision can be made. In keeping with the original meaning of equity, derived from the Latin equitas, this exercise is inseparable from a personal and specific frame of mind: that of equanimity or an inner sense of justice. This brings us to the essential point of remedial justice. All of us can witness the fact that inequalities exist. It is the responsibility of the judicial system to remedy these inequalities—and here again I concur with Chief Justice Pierre Drai, who earlier quoted Jean Charbonnier on this point—by essentially inverting them. Ostad Elahi’s conduct was a perfect illustration of this point, as he would pay special attention to the rights of the needy and the weak, those such as minors and orphans who required the protection of the Court. And in this way, discrimination, which accompanies resentment, insubordination, and revolt, is replaced by balance and moderation. Hence, as Ostad would say, "The best course of action lies in moderation." This should not be misconstrued as a matter of merely compromising or choosing the lesser of two evils. On the contrary, it is a summit that can only be reached through inner purification and perfect application of the fundamental principles of ethics. Beyond the moderation of equity, Ostad Elahi also emphasized humanity and compassion, which would perhaps explain why he never issued a death sentence during his tenure as a judge.

To conclude, the philosophical foundations of Ostad Elahi’s judicial practice are rooted in the inner depths of an individual, in his very conscience. The study of these foundations leads one to a critical examination of the nature of this conscience, which in turn leads to the greater question of the metaphysical significance of human beings, an important discussion that clearly requires more than a single lecture.